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Philosophy as a Cultural Resoure and Medium of
Reetion for Hermann Weyl
Erhard Sholz, Wuppertal
1
Abstrat
Here we review a kind of post-World-War-II "Nahtrag" to H. Weyl's
philosophial omments on mathematis and the natural sienes pub-
lished in the middle of the 1920s. In a talk given at Zürih in the late
1940s, Weyl disussed F.Gonseth's dialetial epistemology and onsid-
ered it as being restrited too stritly to aspets of historial hange. His
own experienes with post-Kantian dialetial philosophy, in partiular
J.G. Fihte's derivation of the onept of spae and matter, had been
a stronger dialetial bakground for his own 1918 studies in purely in-
ntitesimal geometry and the early geometrially unied eld theory of
matter (extending the Mie-Hilbert program). Although now Weyl distan-
tiated himself from the speulative features of his youthful philosophizing
and in partiular from his earlier enthusiasm for Fihte, he again had deep
doubts as to the ultural foundations of modern mathematial sienes and
its role in material ulture of high modernity. For Weyl, philosophial "re-
etion" was a ultural neessity; he now turned towards K. Jasper's and
M. Heidegger's existentialism to nd deeper grounds, similar to his turn
towards Fihte's philosophy after World War I.
Introdution
Philosophers might get interested in Hermann Weyl for many reasons. One of
these may be his expliitly philosophial publiations, rst of all and best known
his Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenshaften (Weyl 1927) written
in 1926 as a ontribution to the Handbuh der Philosophie (English translation
with omments and appendies 1949). Moreover his mathematial and sienti
work ontains in many plaes, sometimes in deisive branhing regions of his
thought, philosophial arguments from whih Weyl drew motivations for the
sienti questions posed or the researh orientation hosen.
Among philosophies to whih Weyl referred, Husserl's phenomenology is the
best known. Weyl's relationship to phenomenology has been investigated and
doumented in several publiations,
2
but Weyl never beame a devoted adherent
of any single philosophy. He rather was a wanderer through the philosophial
elds diering with the hanges in his sienti views,
3
his personal environ-
1
I want to thank the organizers of the onferene at Cret Berard for their interest and the
opportunity to present the remarks on H. Weyl to a predominantly philosophial audiene,
John Stahel and Skúli Sigurdsson for disussions, linguisti support and ritial remarks to
earlier versions of the paper.
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Among them (van Dalen 1984), (Tonietti 1988), (da Silva 1997), (Tieszen 2000) and
(Manosu 2000). Da Silva argues onviningly for a lose methodologial link between Husserl
and Weyl's Das Kontinuum, whereas he is muh more autious on Husserl's overall role for
Weyl than Tonietti. I tend to be even more autious and to agree with the septial remarks
in this respet by Paolo Manosu and Thomas Rykman in (Manosu 2000) at the oasion
of their edition of and omments on the orrespondene between Weyl and Oskar Beker. See
below (beginning of the setion Fihte's dialetial onstrution. . . ).
3
An early example his alienation from a (narrow) Kantianism under the inuene of his
awareness of Hilbert's work on the foundations of geometry at the beginning of his university
studies in 1904/05
ment,
4
and with ultural and soial breaks in his environment. In partiular
he strongly felt the inuenes of both great wars of the 20th entury and was
deeply aeted by the soial and ultural hanges resulting from them.
On this oasion I do not want to go into either Weyl's more systemati
exposition of a Philosophy of Mathematis and Natural Sienes (Weyl 1949) or
his relationship with Husserl's philosophy. Rather I shall disuss some aspets
of his relationship with dialetial philosophies of his time, those of Ferdinand
Gonseth and Martin Heidegger, or of some identiable inuene on his sienti
work, like Johann Gottlieb Fihte's Wissenshaftslehre, whih Weyl ame lose
to in his early years at Zürih, under the inuene of Fritz Medius.
5
Some remarks by Weyl on Gonseth's dialetial philosophy and on
Heidegger
In his philosophially and foundationally (with respet to mathematis) most
radial phase, between 1916 and 1923/24, Weyl pursued his intention of bas-
ing mathematis and physis on immediate intuition (unmittelbare Einsiht)
(Weyl 1921, 146) or on what he alled an analysis of essene attempted by phe-
nomenologial philosophy (von der phänomenologishen Philosophie (Husserl)
angestrebte Wesensanalyse) (Weyl 1918b,
4
1921, 133). At that time he rejeted
the more formal methods of onstrution of mathematial knowledge proposed,
among others, by his former teaher David Hilbert. In the middle of the 1920s he
reapproahed Hilbert's position on the foundations of mathematis to a ertain
degree and oneded to formal mathematis founded on axiomati priniples a
potentiality for the intelletual appropriation of external reality or its symboli
representation, as Weyl preferred to formulate it, whih went far beyond what
he had aepted some years earlier. In a phase of restruturing of his thought
between 1920 and 1922, he ame to the onvition that some transendent re-
ality (God, matter . . . ) lies beyond the realm of phenomenologially aessible
reality, whih at least in some aspets (e.g. matter understood as a dynamial
agent) might be indiretly represented by mathematial symbols the nature and
exat form of whih had still to be explored (for a short phase in the early 1920s
he onsidered singularities of lassial elds as a possible andidate) or invented
and developed (at the end of the 1920s he turned towards spinor elds with an
additional U(1) gauge symmetry and, at least in priniple, their mathematially
highly problematial seond quantization). In this ase he realized that formal
mathematis might even have an advantage over immediately insightful (phe-
nomenologial) mathematis, beause in its oneptual onstitution it was free
from the restritions of the latter. I will all this view the symboli realism of
the mature Weyl.
The topi of symboli realism was taken up and elaborated by Weyl in his
ontribution Wissenshaft als symbolishe Konstruktion des Menshen (Siene
as Symboli Constrution of Man) to the Eranos Jahrbuh (Weyl 1948), in
whih he skethed, now as a sexagenarian, a kind of résumé of the transition
4
His personal relationship with Husserl's student Helene Joseph, beginning in 1912 and soon
to beome his wife, and his aquaintane and later friendship with Fritz Medius, professor
of pedagogy and philosophy in Zürih, after 1913 had strong inuenes on the philosophial
world of disourse, in whih Weyl hose his own point of view.
5
For better evaluation of the harater of the inuene see the disussion in the last
setion of this paper.
2
from the early modern, mehanisti image of nature and the role of mathematis
in it to the state it had assumed in the lassial modern view of the rst half
of the 20th entury. This résumé is omparable to and ontinues the one he
had attempted in his Philosophie der Mathematik und der Naturwissenshaften
more than twenty years earlier. It was quite dierent in ontent from the rst
one, due to further advanes, not at all reassuring for Weyl, in the foundations
of mathematis and in fundamental physis.
Weyl haraterized the quintessene of the transition as a replaement of
the old mehanisti onstrution of the world in the sense of some assumed
spatio-temporal materiality understood in an atomisti sense by a onstrution
in pure symbols (Weyl 1948, 295). He deplored the fat that physiists and
philosophers had both ontinued to . . .
. . . stik stubbornly to the priniples of a mehanisti interpretation
of the world (mehanistishe Weltdeutung) after physis had, in its
fatual struture, already outgrown the latter. They have the same
exuse as the inhabitant of the mainland (Landmensh) who for the
rst time travels on the open sea: he will desparately try to stay in
sight of the vanishing oast line, as long as there is no other oast
in sight, towards whih he steers. (Weyl 1948, 299)
In his own perspetive of a onstrution of the world in pure symbols, his
symboli realism as I alled it above, Weyl hoped to see the rst ontours of a
new oast line. He frankly admitted, however, that he was not able to exlude
the possibility that, perhaps, . . . we are only deeived by a fog-bank (ibid.).
On that bakground he disussed Einstein's priniple of relativity (approvingly)
and Bohr's priniple of omplementarity, whih he wanted to aept only as far
as it orresponds to a fat in quantum physis, whih an be given a preise
mathematial meaning (Weyl 1948, 338). We should take into aount for this
passage that in 1948 about twenty years of hard work had been invested by
physiists and mathematiians to link quantum physis with speial relativity.
About the time of Weyl's talk the young generation of theoretial physiists
were just ahieving a deisive step forward with renormalizable quantum ele-
trodynamis (Shweber 1994), whereas the wider perspetive of a synthesis of
gravitation and quantum physis was still deeply overed by some barely iden-
tiable fog-bank.
At this plae, Weyl made a short exursion to the outlook of Gonseth's
philosophy, as presented, e.g. in (Gonseth 1943):
The all for a dialetization of knowledge rings out from Zürih. It
is not ompletely lear to me what this means. (Weyl 1948, 339)
He agreed with Gonseth that modern siene ontinues to reate a theoretial
image of the world, although this image and the language in whih it is for-
mulated is no longer restrited by any xed a priori but is shaped by sienti
experiene and  its interpretations (Deutungen) whih are fored upon it by the
ontext of siene itself. Although Gonseth had, of ourse, analyzed the epis-
temi role of some of these Deutungen in a stronger sense than Weyl presented
in this short referene, i.e. as onstitutive shemata in knowledge produ-
tion,
6
Weyl essentially agreed with Gonseth thus far. But, in the evaluation
6
Cf. (Heinzmann 1982, here, pp. 89.).
3
of the range of the hange from the formerly xed a priori to the onstruted
onstitutive shemata, he had a dierene that he frankly stated:
But this free outlook, whih does justie to the interation between
onstrution and reetion, probably does not yet deserve the label
of dialeti. (ibid.)
Suh a ritial remark was not at all dismissive with respet to dialetial
thought, as one might expet from a mathematial sientist ative in one of the
two ultures of the 20th entury.
7
As distint from most of the ontemporary
sientists and mathematiians, Weyl had beome aquainted with the dialetial
philosophy of (post-Kantian) German idealism in his early Zürih years under
the inuene of F. Medius, and had, in partiular, intensely studied Fihte's
Wissenshaftslehre. As a result, he requested from a proper dialeti that it
should be riher in the interplay of internal oppositions than just allowing for
oneptual shifts in the historial development of knowledge systems. Following
a short presentation of Gonseth's disussion of the onept of veloity and its
modiation by relativity, he ommented:
In the new relativisti piture the original onepts are `lifted (aufge-
hoben)' in Hegel's double meaning of the word. That may be a-
urate in the historial sense, but even then it would only be a
`historial' dialeti. (ibid.)
In the late 1940s, Weyl had distaned himself onsiderably from Fihte. As
he expliitly stated, he now sympathized with another version of dialetial
thought, existential philosophy, e.g. in the Heideggerian form (Weyl 1948,
343). To hint, at least at the diretion in whih he looked for a onnetion
between existentialist philosophy and modern siene, Weyl presented a simple
but strong onsideration that would ounterat or even prevent any attempt to
strive for a new redutionisti world piture.
He reminded his audiene that quantum physis (QP) posed a muh more
fundamental riddle than relativity theory (RT). In RT the lassial onepts
of kinematis and dynamis were lifted in a way that allowed a reonstru-
tion and understanding of prerelativisti thought well dened mathematially
and physially. Critially reeting the Copenhaguen interpretation of quantum
mehanis from his point of view, he ontrasted this well dened oneptual on-
netion in RT with the dilemma outlined by Bohr for QP, whih arose from the
neessity to represent the hidden physial proess, by a mathematial symbol-
ism dissoiated from lassial physis and everyday experiene. On the other
hand he delared that natural understanding of the world and the language in
whih it is expressed is neessary for the proess of measurement and observa-
tion and its desription, perhaps slightly puried and laried (gereinigt und
geklärt) by lassial physis. He saw no possibility for a omplete theory of
measurement and observation in terms of QP. On the assumption that suh a
dierene might ontinue to hold in the future, he ommented:
Then we had, here, a true dialeti, impossible to lift by any histori-
al development: the hidden soil (der dunkle Boden) [of everyday life
and natural language, ES℄ an be illuminated from the higher view-
point of quantum physis, but it remains the ground (Grund) that
7
Cf. (Sigurdsson 2001).
4
annot be dissolved into the light of the higher region. (Weyl 1948,
341)
Suh an unresolvable opposition reminded Weyl of a omparable one in exis-
tential philosophy. There the Dasein (being-there) as the form of being, whih
inludes self-awareness, is ahieved by human beings rising to onsiousness of
themselves. On the other hand the same proess neessarily led to a burial
of the external world in nothingness, and thus made it neessary later to
prove the latter indiretly. The rise of human ognition to a rationalist self-
onsiousness of an individual (Cartesian) self, led neessarily to what Weyl now
alled the problem of the external world (Problem der Aussenwelt).
8
(O)ne attempts to glue the isolated subjet left behind to the dison-
neted pathes of the world, but it remains a pathwork. (Weyl 1948,
344)℄
Although Weyl admitted that his argument for omparability between the dif-
ferent oppositions in QP and existential philosophy had no ompelling power,
he nevertheless insisted on the value of the problem posed by this observa-
tion. Moreover, he indiated how the existential split between the larity of
self-onsious being-there (Dasein) and the dark pathes of insight of the ex-
ternal world might be resolved, not by a progression in pure thought, but by a
transition to another way of life and being, in whih the self might be perieved
as part of a ommuniating web of self-onsious beings and the broader world
in whih they live.
In understanding myself as being-together-with (seiend-mit) I also
understand dierent being-there (Dasein). This is not, however, a
knowledge ahieved and onluded by new ognition, but a primary
existential way of being that is the onditio sine qua non for ognition
and knowledge. (ibid.)
We nd other notes and speehes whih show that, after the experiene of the
destrutive powers unleashed by the Seond World War, existential philosophy
had beome for Weyl a medium of reetion not neessarily leading to onse-
quenes for sienti knowledge, but endowed with a value of its own. Thirty
years earlier in his life, in his enounter with Fihte's philosophy during and
shortly after the First World War, things had been slightly dierent in this re-
spet. Weyl had been attrated by philosophial onsiderations as a young man,
but at that time he tried to onnet his newly-gained philosophial onvitions
to his ongoing sienti researh.
Fihte's dialetial onstrution of the onept of spae
In his glane bak at his intelletual life, Erkenntnis und Besinnung (Weyl 1954),
Weyl reounted his turn towards Fihte'sWissenshaftslehre under the inuene
of F. Medius. He admitted to having been seized by Fihte's idealist meta-
physis, although he had been luky enough to nd a ounterweight in Helene's
(his wife's) more sober style of thought, shaped by Husserl's phenomenology:
8
This formulation is lose in language and ontent to the problem of matter (Problem der
Materie) that Weyl had enountered in the later 1920s, after he had given up the redutionist
idea of deriving matter strutures, in a Mie-type approah, from pure (lassial) eld theory.
5
I had to onede to her that Fihte, by his stubbornness in pursuing
an idea, blind to nature and fats, was swept away into inreasingly
abstruse onstrutions. (Weyl 1954, 637)
On the other hand, he had been impressed and attrated by Fihte, whom in
1954 he still esteemed as a
. . . onstrutivist of the purest water, who pursues his independent
path of ontrution without looking right or left (Weyl 1954, 641).
This haraterization gives a lue as to why the young mathematiian Weyl
was attrated by Fihte in the years between 1916 and 1921. At that time
Weyl did not refer muh to Fihte in his publiations; nevertheless he did not
ompletely hide the attration and sympathy he felt for Fihte's philosophy.
On the rst pages of Das Kontinuum, he disussed the diult problem of a
philosophially satisfying lariation of the foundations of logi and onfessed:
We annot hope to give here a nal lariation of the essene of
fat, judgement, objet, property; this task leads into metaphysial
abysses; about these one has to seek advie from men whose name
annot be stated without earning a ompassionate smile (mitleidiges
Läheln)  e.g. Fihte. (Weyl 1918a, 2)
At the time more esteem ould be expeted among mathematiians, in parti-
ular from the Göttingen milieu, from referenes to Husserls's philosophy. Thus
we nd more frequently publi referenes to Husserl's Phänomenologie than
to Fihte's Wissenshaftslehre, initially restrited, however, to the disussion
of the problem of time and Husserl's Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie
(Husserl 1913).
9
After Weyl had formulated his purely innitesimal geometry,
he looked for a more philosophial underpinning of his new geometry, and pro-
eeded, in 1920 and the following years, to an a priori derivation of its struture
by what he then alled the mathematial analysis of the problem of spae (math-
ematishe Analyse des Raumproblems). His turn of thought oinided with the
publiation of Husserl's altered (seond) edition of Logishe Untersuhungen in
the years 1921 (vol. II) and 1922 (vol. I). P. Manosu and T. Rykman argue
that Weyl only then started to read the latter with some are. In fat, in a
letter-of-thanks (Marh 26/27, 1921) for the gift of the 2nd edition of the Lo-
gishe Untersuhungen by its author, Weyl wrote to Husserl that he had only
now been able to get some superial aquaintane with the book's ontent
(Husserl 1994, 290).
When he inluded a rst sketh of his investigations on the Raumproblem in
the 4th edition of Raum - Zeit - Materie it appeared tting to him to delare
his reent investigations to be an analysis of essene as attempted by phe-
nomenologial philosophy (von der phänomenologishen Philosophie (Husserl)
angestrebte Wesensanalyse) (Weyl 1918b,
4
1921, 133). This remark inluded,
now, a global and non-expliit referene to Husserl's Logishe Untersuhungen
(Husserl 1901/02). We better abstain, however, from reading into it a long-range
impat of Husserl's phenomenology on Weyl's own researhes.
10
His letter to
9
Referenes in Das Kontinuum (Weyl 1918a, iv) and at the beginning of Raum - Zeit -
Materie (Spae - Time - Matter) (Weyl 1918b, 4, footn. 1).
10
The dialogue between Weyl and Husserl may also have found expression the other way
round. In the 2nd edition of vol. I of Logishe Untersuhungen, we nd interesting disussions
6
Husserl was written three to four years after Weyl's rst fundamental ontri-
butions to the foundations of mathematis and purely innitesimal geometry
(gauge geometry) in 1918, nearly two years after his onversion to Brouwer's
intuitionism, and at a time when he was oming lose to the end of his most
radial phase in foundations of mathematis and unied eld theory based on
a dynamisti natural philosophy. At this time the mathematial analysis of
the problem of spae opened up for him a path towards a ontinuation of his
interest in gauge geometrial strutures without a neessary link to a purely
eld theoreti (Mie type) explanation of matter. Even taking into aount
the appropriate modesty of Weyl as a sienti orrespondent with respet to
the professional philosopher, we nd here a onvining additional evidene for
Weyl's own later evaluation that, although Husserl's phenomenologial philoso-
phy had helped him in nding a path towards a freer view of the world than
the positivist one, it had not been the strongest intelletual referene for him
during his years of Sturm and Drang (Weyl 1954, 637).
As I have already argued on another oasion (Sholz 1995), Fihte's diale-
tial onstrution of the onept of spae seems to have been of more importane
for the development of Weyl's researh orientation in this early, philosophially
radial, phase of his work. In order to make the argument more aessible (and
thus ritiizable) I want to give a short outline of some features of Fihte's phi-
losophy as a radial onstrutivist at work in (dialetially) onstruting the
onept of spae, both topis lose to Weyl's mind in the years between 1916
and 1920.
11
Fihte onsidered dialetis as the form of movement in the self-onstrution
of thought, and desribed this oneption in words that ame to meet Weyl's
needs in his searh for intelletual orientation and support in the metaphysial
abysses of the philosophial lariation of the foundations of logi. Fihte
explained, e.g., in this ontext that he was not keen to develop the dialetis of
making up or inventing something (die Dialektik des Aus- oder Erdenkens); he
wanted to ahieve a way of organizing the thought proess in a way suh that
we are seized by evidene. This was, aording to Fihte, the task of a true
dialeti.
Ingenuity gives only sudden evidene whih an vanish again; true
dialeti is the lawful method to ahieve evidene. . . .Constrution is
now the instrution to invent the onept by the imaginative power,
suh that evidene may be gained. (Fihte 1834, 188)
12
A omparable laim for a diret link between onstrution and evidene runs
like a ontinuous thread through Weyl's radial writings on the foundations
of analysis; in fat, on the level of basi methodologial onvitions, it unites
of the Idee der reinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre and the division of labour among mathemati-
ians/sientists and philosophers (Husserl 1901/02, vol. I (
2
1921), 258.).
11
See also the remarks on Fihte in (da Silva 1997).
12
Dies ist niht die Dialektik des Aus- und Erdenkens, sondern das Denken maht sih uns
selbst, die Evidenz ergreift uns. Durh Genie nur plötzlihe Evidenz, die wieder entshwinden
kann; wahre Dialektik aber die gesetzmäÿige Methode, zu dieser Evidenz zu kommen. Die
Kunst der Dialektik, wie alle Kunst, ist unendlih; niht aber die Wahrheit. Constrution
ist nun die Anleitung, durh die Einbildungkraft den Begri zu ernden, daÿ die Evidenz
sih einstelle. Es giebt da gleihsam eine ursprünglihe, und nah dieser ringen wir. Wie in
der Mathematik: niht die Wahrheit wird gemaht, sondern nur der Vortrag der Wahrheit.
(emphasis in the original)
7
the dierent, more tehnial positions whih he adhered to between 1916 and
1920/21, from the prediative, arithmetio-logial foundation in (Weyl 1918a)
to the (quasi-)intuitionisti strategy of (Weyl 1921).
As a philosophial resoure of inspiration for Weyl, Fihte's onstrution or
derivation of the onept of spae seems to have been of far larger range. I
sketh the most important features (in the Weylian ontext) following Fihte's
exposition in the Grundriÿ des Eigenthümlihen der Wissenshaftslehre (Fihte
1795).
Fihte started from two opposing, initially separated, external pereptions,
i.e. pereptions of appearanes,X and Y (Fihte's own symbolism, (Fihte 1795,
194)). As appearanes X and Y were, for Fihte, expressions of two fores that
had to be assumed neessarily (ibid. 197). Spae was then developed by Fihte
as the initially still unknown external determination of the possible relations
between X and Y (i.e., in partiular not generated by the interior determina-
tions of the appearanes X and Y ). For this determination (whih later in the
development  or onstrution  would beome spae) he introdued the
formal symbol O.
Now, the mode how X is thus determined, i.e. by its relation to the
totalitiy of possible relations, may be symbolized as x, and the mode how Y
is thus determined as y. In this way, Fihte introdued symbols of external
positioning x and y for the appearanes X and Y ,13 and emphasized that the
relation between X and Y , and thus O (the onept of spae in generation),
ould by no means be derived from the self, but must be attributed to the
things themselves (ibid. 195).
Fihte ontinued his argumentat that X and Y suer exlusion and ontinu-
ity (Ausshlieÿung und Continuität) and that by suh an interplay a ommon
sphere is generated.
14
For the onept of spae in generation Fihte postulated:
O must be something whih leaves the liberty of both (X and Y ,
ES) in their ativity ompletely undisturbed. (Fihte 1795, 198)
15
Correspondingly, the external positionings x and y then represent also spheres
of ativity (Sphären der Wirksamkeit) of the fores assumed neessarily for
the appearanes X and Y . These must not, initially, be onsidered from an
extensional point of view, i.e. spaelike. Only after the formation of a ommon
sphere of both
[O will be ℄ . . . posited (gesezt) as extended, onneted, innitely
divisible and is Spae. (ibid. 200).
One the onept of spae has been derived, the positions (x and y et.) are
to be understood as result of an innite division of spae, as `ìnnitely smallest
parts of spae. Fihte was quite denite, though, that suh parts ould not be
onsidered as points:
13
In fat, Fihte used dierent small letters, z and v, in plae of our x and y, whih we use
here for mnemoni reasons.
14
Es wird demnah durh absolute Spontaneität der Einbildungskraft eine solhe gemein-
shaftlihe Sphäre produirt (ibid. 196).
15
To readers aquainted with Weyl's analysis of the problem of spae, a striking similiarity
to the latter's postulate of freedom may ome to mind, when reading this Fihtean step.
8
The innitely smallest part of spae is always a spae, something
endowed with ontinuity, not at all a mere point or the boundary
between speied plaes in spae. (ibid., 200)
In these innitesimal parts
16
the imaginative power (Einbildungskraft)
17
puts up a fore whih expresses itself with neessity. Fihte thus arrived at a
ommon oneptualization of spae and systems of fores that went far beyond
the Kantian dynamisti onept of matter in the Metaphysishe Anfangsgründe
der Naturwissenshaften.
Thus intensity (here: fore, ES) and extensity (spae, ES) are by
neessity synthetially united, and one must not try to disuss the
one without the other. (Fihte 1795, 201)
Fihte onluded:
Eah fore, by its neessary produt, lls (. . . ) a plae in spae;
and spae is nothing but that whih is lled or to be lled by these
produts. (ibid, 201)
I have already said that plaes in spae (Stellen im Raume) were not to be
onsidered as points but as innitely smallest parts.
To summarize, Fihte onstruted a onept of spae starting from spheres
of ativities (x, y, et.) of appearane (X , Y , . . . ); the system O of possible
external relations of these was posited as ontinuous, onneted, and innitely
divisible. Integration of the oneptual struture transformed the spheres of
ativities (x, y, . . . ) into innitesimal parts of O, whih thus beame the symbol
and onept of spae. The innitesimal parts were arriers of fores whih Fihte
onsidered as the primordial spae-lling strutures.
In slightly more mathematial language we nd here a lear and beautiful
anity to three essential topis in Weyl's purely innitesimal geometry and
his rst unied gauge eld-and-matter theory of 1918:
18
 onstrution of a spaelike ontinuum from innitesimal parts (not as a
set of points, endowed only in an additional step with a ontinuous, dier-
entiable, et. struture, as intended  not yet ahieved  by mainstream
mathematis of the time),
 haraterization of the spae-lling entities as fores, the ations of whih
were initially speied only in the innitesimal parts (Weyl's postulate to
build geometrial strutures purely innitesimally),
 formation of matter as a form of appearane of spae-lling fores (dynam-
ial theory of matter, going bak to Kant and mathematially rejuvenated
by Mie and Hilbert).
16
Innitesimal is a word introdued by me (ES) not by Fihte, although the onept is.
17
Probably of the absolute self.
18
On this bakground it does not ome as a great surprise that T. Tonietti, in his exursion
into Weyl's purely innitesimal geometry, realizes at the height of his exposition of this
point that he apparently lost ontat with Husserl, and that he had better ome bak to the
question of Zeitbewuÿtsein, in order to  . . . again enounter Husserl who otherwise might be
forgotten (Tonietti 1988, 366).
9
Weyl's purely innitesimal geometry and his eld/matter theory of
1918
In order not to be misunderstood, I want to state the obvious in advane: Weyl's
purely innitesimal geometry and (gauge) eld theory of 1918 were, of ourse,
muh more than a mere transformation of Fihtean ideas into mathematis and
physis. There was a substantial and omplex bakground in the mathematial
and physial knowledge of the time, deeply shaped by the work of Albert Ein-
stein and extended by G. Mie, D. Hilbert, T. Levi-Civita, and others.
19
The
intelletual work to be done was too demanding and tehnially too umber-
some, to allow suh a (bad) redution. In addition, our mathematiian was
onfronted with the beneial warnings of Helene Weyl not to follow Fihte's
obstinay, blind to nature and fats, in pursuing his ideas, without suient
reetion and intelletual distane. The over-enthusiasti language in key pub-
liations of the years 1918 to 1921 shows that he was, in fat, in suh a danger.
He experiened these years of soial and politial disorder as a time of ultural
risis, and was all the more longing for a path towards an alleged transendent
order.
20
Already by November 1917, when he nished his work on Das Kontinuum
with its prediative onstrution of the arithmetially denable subset of the
lassial real ontinuum, Weyl was dissatised with his own theory.
21
In publi
he ompared it with Husserl's disussion of the ontinuum of time, whih had a
non-atomisti harater, in drasti ontrast to his own theory. No determined
point of time an be exhibited, only approximative xing is possible, just as
is the ase for the ontinuum of spatial intuition (Kontinuum der räumlihen
Anshauung) (Weyl 1918a, 70f.). Fihte had insisted on the same feature, as
Weyl knew well at the time, but preferred not to touh upon expliitly at this
plae. However, he himself also aepted the neessity that the mathematial
onept of ontinuum, the ontinuous manifold, should not be haraterized in
terms of modern set theory enrihed by topologial axioms (and axioms for o-
ordinate systems), beause this would ontradit the onept (the essene as
Weyl liked to laim) of the ontinuum. He ontinued to insist on this method-
ologial priniple even after softening his radial position or even turning away
from it. In a paper written in 1925, although published only posthumously, we
nd, perhaps, the learest expression of this Weylian onvition with respet to
the set-theoreti approah to manifolds:
It seems lear that it (set theory, ES) violates against the essene of
the ontinuum, whih, by its very nature, an not at all be battered
into a set of single elements. Not the relationship of an element to
a set, but of a part to the whole ought to be taken as a basis for the
analysis of the ontinuum. (Weyl 1925/1988, 5)
For Weyl, single points of a ontinuum were empty abstrations; an aeptable
abstration would arise only from a limiting proedure of loalization inside a
ontinuum:
19
For a omprehensive view, see (Vizgin 1994), (Stahel 1995), (Cao 1997), for Mie and
Hilbert (Corry 1999a, Corry 1999b).
20
Cf. (Sigurdsson 2001).
21
For Weyl's 1918 approah to foundations of analysis see (Feferman 2000) and (Coleman
2001, 315.), for a disussion of his shifts in foundations (Sholz 2000).
10
The mf. is ontinuous, if the points are fused together in suh a
manner that it is impossible to display a single point, but always
only together with a vaguely limited surrounding halo (Hof), with a
`neighbourhood'. (ibid., 2)
With suh a oneption Weyl entered diult terrain, as no mathematial on-
eptual frame was in sight, whih ould satisfy his methodologial postulate in
a suiently elaborate way. For some years Weyl sympathized with Brouwer's
idea to haraterize points in the intuitionisti one-dimensional ontinuum by
free hoie sequenes of nested intervals (Weyl 1921).
22
He even tried to extend
the idea to higher dimensions and explored the possibility of a purely ombina-
torial approah to the onept of manifold, in whih point-like loalizations were
given only by innite sequenes of nested star neighbourhoods in baryentri
subdivisions of a ombinatorially dened manifold. There arose, however, the
problem of how to haraterize the loal manifold property in purely ombi-
natorial terms. Although Weyl outlined a strategy to, possibly, overome this
problem, his approah remained essentially without long-range eets in 20th
entury topology.
Weyl was muh more suessful on another level of investigation, in his at-
tempts to rebuild dierential geometry in manifolds from a purely innitesimal
point of view. He generalized Riemann's proposal for a dierential geometri
metri
ds2(x) =
n∑
i,j=1
gij(x)dx
idxj
From his purely innitesimal point of view, it seemed a strange eet that the
length of two vetors ξ(x) and η(x′) given at dierent points x and x′ an be
immediately (and in this sense objetively) be ompared in this framework
after the alulation of
|ξ(x)|2 =
n∑
i,j=1
gij(x)ξ
iξj , |η(x′)|2 =
n∑
i,j=1
gij(x
′)ηiηj
In this ontext, it was omparatively easy, for Weyl, to give a purely in-
nitesimal haraterization of metrial onepts. He started from the well known
struture of a onformal metri, i.e. an equivalene lass [g] of semi-Riemannian
metris g = (gij(x)) and g
′ = (g′ij(x)) whih are equal up to a point dependent
positive fator λ(x) > 0, g′ = λg. Then, omparison of length made immedi-
ate sense only for vetors attahed to the same point x, independently of the
gauge of the metri, i.e. the hoie of representative in the onformal lass.
To ahieve omparability of lengths of vetors inside eah innitesimal neigh-
bourhood Weyl invented the onept of length onnetion formed in analogy to
the ane onnetion Γ, just distilled from the lassial Christoel symbols Γkij
of Riemannian geometry by Levi Civita (and himself, as far as the abstration
from the metrial ontext is onerned).
23
The loalization inside suh an in-
nitesimal neighbourhood was given, as would have been done already by the
mathematiians of the past, by oordinate parameters x and x′ = x + dx for
some innitesimal displaement dx. Weyl's length onnetion onsisted, then,
22
More details of this aspet are given in (Sholz 2000)
23
Cf. (Reih 1992), (Bottazzini 1999).
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in an equivalene lass of dierential 1-forms [ϕ], ϕ =
∑n
i=1 ϕidx
i
, where an
equivalent representation of the form is given by ϕ′ = ϕ − d logλ, orrespond-
ing to a hange of gauge of the onformal metri by the fator λ. Weyl alled
this transformation, whih he reognized as neessary for the onsisteny of his
extended symbol system, the gauge transformation of the length onnetion.
That was the rst step towards the investigation of (generalized) onnetions in
modern dierential geometry, i.e. no longer neessarily in the linear group and
derived from a Riemannian metri.
Weyl thus established a purely innitesimal gauge geometry, where lengths
of vetors (or derived metrial onepts in tensor elds) were immediately om-
parable only in the innitesimal neighbourhood of one point, and for points of
nite distane only after an integration proedure. This integration turned
out to be, in general, path dependent. Independene of the hoie of path
between two points x and x′ holds if and only if the length urvature van-
ishes. The onept of urvature was built in diret analogy to the urvature
of the ane onnetion and turned out to be, in this ase, just the exterior
derivative of the length onnetion: f = dϕ. This led Weyl to a oherent and
oneptually pleasing realization of a metrial dierential geometry built upon
purely innitesimal priniples. He explored some features of this geometry,
whih appeared of immediate importane to him: existene and uniqueness of
a ompatible ane onnetion, gauge behaviour (gauge invariane respetively
gauge ovariane speied by gauge weight) of tensors derived from the data
[g], [ϕ] of the Weylian metri, relationship to Riemannian manifolds, in parti-
ular dierent natural hoies of gauge in the (semi-)Riemannian ase, et.
Moreover, Weyl was onvined of important onsequenes of his new gauge
geometry for physis. The inninitesimal neighbourhoods understood as spheres
of ativity, as Fihte might have said, suggested looking for interpretations of
the length onnetion as a eld representing physially ative quantities. And
in fat, building on the (mathematially obvious) observation df = 0, whih
(in oordinates) was formally idential with the seond system of the generally
ovariant Maxwell equations, Weyl immediately drew the onlusion that the
length urvature f ought to be identied with the eletromagneti eld. For
Weyl this had some, initially equally, important onsequenes:
(1) Conservation of urrent appeared as a onsequene of gauge invariane.
(2) Conformal metri, the gauge priniple, length onnetion and ane on-
netion were part of a unied oneptually onvining struture.
(3) Gravitation (with its potential g) and eletromagnetism (potential ϕ) were
intrinsially unied and both identied with onstitutive elements of the
geometri struture.
(4) The Mie-Hilbert theory of a ombined Lagrange funtion L(g, ϕ) for the
ation of the gravitational eld (g) and eletromagnetism (ϕ) was further
geometrized and tehnially enrihed by the priniple of gauge invariane
(for L).
Weyl thus believed for a short while (from 1918 to summer 1920) that his
gauge geometri modiation of the Mie-Hilbert theory would nally show the
path towards the blue ower of dynamism, i.e. an explanation of the stable
strutures of the elementary partiles known at the time (eletron and proton),
12
the mathematial derivation of the basi stable omposite onguration (atoms),
at least in the simplest ases, and their energy levels (spetra).
He gave up the belief, however, in the ontologial orretness of the purely
eld-theoreti approah to matter (point (4) above) in late summer 1920, sub-
stituting in its plae a philosophially motivated a priori argumentation for the
oneptual superiority of his gauge geometry (i.e. point (2)) during the follow-
ing years (his analysis of the problem of spae, 1921  1923).
24
At the end of
the 1920s he nally withdrew the metrial version of the gauge haraterization
of eletromagnetism (point (3) above) and transformed it into the new form of
a U(1) gauge onnetion in the extended symmetries of a generally onvariant
formulation of the Dira equation, whih he proposed in 1929.
25
The gauge
interpretation of urrent onservation (point (1)), nally, was upheld in the
new form. In the early 1930s Pauli assimilated it to the knowledge of quantum
physis, and it beame, in a generalized form, a entral methodologial element
in the self-onstrution of theoretial fundamental physis during the seond
half of the 20th entury.
26
The goal of a unied desription of gravitation and eletromagnetism, and
the derivation of matter strutures from it, was nothing spei to Weyl. After
1915 it had beome a hot topi in Göttingen, after Hilbert's inursion into
general relativity.
27
Hilbert had built upon Mie's work, and Mie was fond of
Kant's dynamisti approah to the problem of matter and other purely eld-
theoreti theories of the eletron mass from the turn of the entury. So Weyl's
attempt at a uniation was in its general perspetive not at all foreign to the
larger enterprise of ontemporary mathematial physis and natural philosophy,
at least in the sienti environment of Göttingen. In Weyl's theory, the purely
innitesimal approah to manifolds and the ensuing possibility to geometrially
unify the two known interation elds gravitation and eletromagnetism, this
perspetive took on a partiularly dense and oneptually sophistiated shape.
Thus it may be not surprising, although perhaps a bit ironi, that Hilbert showed
awareness of the extreme idealization of the geometri lassial eld theoreti
approah to fundamental physis only after he ould reet onWeyl's sharpening
of their ommon approah in the winter 1919/20 (Hilbert 1992, 98.). Hilbert's
surprise regarding Weyl's theoretial program whih was so lose in its goals to
his own enterprise, only oneptually more densely knit, helped him, apparently,
to reet ritially on the attempts to derive matter strutures from lassial
elds. He now felt, that the ompleted proess of physial idealization building
upon lassially deterministi mathematial strutures would neessarily lead to
what he now alled pejoratively Hegelian physis (Hilbert 1992, 100), as a label
for an all-embraing omplete determinism. Suh a world view would neessarily
run into the paradoxes of time inversion also holding for organi proesses and,
even stranger, the following eet:
Deisions in the proper sense ould not take plae at all, and the
whole world proess would not transend the limited ontent of a
nite thought. . . . For the same reason also intelletual ulture (das
Geistige), in partiular our thought, had to be something merely
24
Cf. (Coleman 2001, 215.) and (Sholz 2001, 85.).
25
Cf. (Straumann 2001) and (Vizgin 1994, hap.5).
26
Cf. (O'Raifeartaigh/Straumann 2000).
27
Cf. (Vizgin 1994), (Corry 1999b), (Corry 1999a), (Renn/Stahell 1999), (Rowe 2000),
(Goldstein/Ritter 2000).
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ephemeral (etwas bloÿ Sheinbares)  an absurd onsequene for a
view of nature whih results from the attempt to make all elements
of reality (all Inhalte der Wirklihkeit) aessible to our thought.
(Hilbert 1992, 100f., emph. in original)
Hilbert was thus struggling, like Weyl, with the problem of how lassial
determinism in the theory of nature ould go in hand with a unifying world
view. In his stubborn rejetion of post-Kantian dialetial philosophy, expressed
in his misled stereotype of Hegelian physis, he pointed to a eld that had
served as a ultural bakground for Weyl. He apparently was not aware that in
its onrete manifestation it was Johann Gottlieb Fihte's philosophy and not
Hegel's, whih had inspired the sienti imagination of his former student.
28
Moreover, his polemis ontain an unnotied and unvoluntary self-ironi twist:
Hilbert apparently did not realize that the verdit of a Hegelian physis might
just as well, or even with stronger justiation than to Weyl's program, be
applied to his own theory.
29
Weyl's late reetions on Heidegger
What Weyl owed to Fihte's philosophy annot and should not be desribed
as a philosophial inuene on mathematis, not even in the slightly more
restrited version of a presumed inuene of Fihte's philosophy of spae and
fore on dierential geometry, foundations of mathematis, and/or eld physis.
Fihte's philosophy was, of ourse, no historial agent or even ator. Its role
in the genesis of Weyl's ontribution to innitesimal geometry, the onept of
ontinuum, and eld theory is muh more preisely desribed as that of a ul-
tural resoure whih Weyl utilized. This perspetive appears helpful for leaving
behind the disiplinary boundaries in the investigation of the history of mathe-
matis and siene in general.
30
Not in all ases, however, ould Weyl's resort
to philosophers or philosophies be adequately desribed as a resoure made
servieable in his sienti work. We have seen above, how Weyl referred to
Heidegger's existentialist or Gonseth's dialetial philosophies in 1948. He was
fond of, and probably needed, a broad reetion on his ativities as part of a
onsious embedding in a ultural setting. Weyl onsidered suh reetions as
one part of a dyad on the other side of wih he saw and pratised sienti
ativity, onstrution as he liked to say. Although he talked about them in
terms of Besinnung (ontemplation), whih sounds surprisingly inoensive and
harmonious, these reetions were not at all of a harmonizing and introspetive
nature.
Just to the ontrary. Weyl was deeply bewildered by the great rises of the
20th entury, the First World War and the following revolutionary disturbanes,
the rise of Nazism in Germany, the Seond World War with the holoaust and
the (let us hope short-lived) Naziation of the European ontinent,
31
and
the ensuing menae of nulear destrution. The goal of his Besinnung was to
ope with suh disonerting experienes and to nd some defendable position
28
If Hilbert had known, he probably would not have ared.
29
Jürgen Renn and John Stahel thus all Hilbert's original program of 1915. an attempt
of a theory of everything (Renn/Stahell 1999).
30
I thank Skúli Sigurdsson who in our disussions insisted on suh a distintion and empha-
sized, in partiular, the resoure aspet of philosophy for Weyl; ompare (Sigurdsson 2001)
31
H. Weyl to A. Johnson, Marh 22, 1941, quoted from (Siegmund-Shultze 2001, 285).
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towards them. Weyl's late turn towards Heidegger's philosophy is apparently an
expression of the experiene of being ast into a world that had turned out to
be soio-ulturally unreliable and had developed strong features of destrutive-
ness. Perhaps the strongest expression of his deep ultural doubts at this time
an be found in a manusript on The development of mathematis sine 1900,
in whih he drew a parallel between Aristotle's haraterization of metaphysis
and of his own thoughts about modern mathematis:
. . . Here some words of Aristotle ome to my mind whih, to be
true, refer to metaphysis rather than mathematis. Stressing its
uselessness as muh as Hardy does in his apology of mathematis,
but at the same time its divinity, he says (Metaphysis 982b): `For
this reason its aquisition might justly be supposed to be beyond
human power; sine in many aspets human nature is servile; in
whih ase, as Simonides says, `God alone an have this privilege',
and man should only seek the knowledge whih is of onern to
him (τ η`ν καϑ' αυ˙τ o`ν ǫ˙πιστη´µην). Indeed if the prets are right
and the Deity is by nature jealous, it is probable that in this ase
they would be partiularly jealous and all those who step beyond
(πα´ντας τoυ`ς πǫριττoυ´ς) are liable to misfortune.'
I am not so sure whether we mathematiians during the last deades
have not `stepped beyond' the human realm by our abstrations.
Aristotle, who atually speaks about metaphysis rather than math-
ematis, omforts us by hinting that the envy of the Gods is but a
lie of the prets (`prets tell many a lie' as the proverb says).
For us today the idea that the Gods from whih we wrestled the
seret of knowledge by symboli onstrution will revenge our υβρις
has taken on a quite onrete form. For who an lose his eyes
against the menae of our self-destrution by siene; the alarming
fat is that the rapid progress of sienti knowledge is unparalleled
by a ongruous growth of man's moral strength and responsibility,
whih has hardly hane in historial time. (Weyl Ms 1949a, 6f.)
Thus Weyl's Besinnung did not at all avoid or ompensate for unomfortable
experienes. He posed and presented problems arising in mathematis, ulture
and soiety as sharply as he ould. Although he feared the menae arising from
what he, in his eduated language shaped by the lassial humanist tradition,
alled the hubris of modern mankind, he did not give up the hope that another
mode of (existential) being might be possible. In his formulation inspired by
Heidegger, ited at the beginning of this artile, he speied this mode as that
of seiend-mit, of being-together-with. For Weyl, remarks suh as the one just
ited show that he longed for a moral quality of being together whih we might
prefer to all a mode of onviviality using the later terminology proposed by
(Illih 1973).
32
From Weyl's perspetive, suh a mode of onvivial being and life
might in turn ontribute to the self-understanding of siene and beome part of
the sienti enterprise, although in this ase too he felt only faint ontours of
32
We an thus express a distintion to a purely Heideggerian bakground. That seems
appropriate, beause the person M. Heidegger was too losely aliated with Nazi politis, at
least in the rst years after their rise to power, to aept that he and his philosophy might
have beome, without speiations, a morally attrative point of referene for Weyl in 1948.
15
suh a hope, outbalaned by the fear expressed at the end of our last quotation.
Nothing assured or assures us of the suess of a turn in this diretion, however
neessary it may be.
Referenes
Bottazzini, Umberto. 1999. Rii and Levi-Civita: from dierential invariants
to general relativity. In (Gray 1999). pp. 241259.
Cao, Tian Yu. 1997. Coneptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories.
Cambridge: University Press.
Coleman, Robert; Korté, Herbert. 2001. Hermann Weyl: Mathematiian, physi-
ist, philosopher. In (Sholz 2001). pp. 161388.
Corry, Leo. 1999a. David Hilbert between mehanial and eletromagneti
redutionism (19101915). Arhive for History of Exat Sienes 53:489
527.
Corry, Leo. 1999b. From Mie's eletromagneti theory of matter to Hilbert's
unied foundations of physis. Studies in the History and Philosophy of
Modern Physis 30:159183.
da Silva, Jairo J. 1997. Husserl's phenomenology and Weyl's preditivism.
Synthese 110:277296.
Deppert, W. e.a. (ed.s.). 1988. Exat Sienes and Their Philosophial Founda-
tions. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang. Weyl, Kiel Kongress 1985.
Feferman, Solomon. 2000. The signiane of Weyl's Das Kontinuum. In
(Hendriks 2000). pp. 179194.
Fihte, Johann Gottlieb. 1795. Grundriss des Eigenthümlihen der Wis-
senshaftslehre in Rüksiht auf das theoretishe Vermögen. Jena  Leipzig.
Werke I, 331411. GA I.3, 142208.
Fihte, Johann Gottlieb. 1834. Einleitung in die Wissenshaftslehre. Nahge-
lassene Werke, Bd. I. Bonn: Adolph Marus. Nahdruk de Gruyter 1962.
Goldstein, Catherine; Ritter, Jim. 2000. The varieties of unity: Sounding uni-
ed theories 19201930. Berlin: Preprint 149, MPI für Wissenshafts-
geshihte.
Gonseth, Ferdinand. 1943. Die Dialektisierung der Erkenntnis. Zürih: ETH,
Kultur- und Staatswissenshaftlihe Shriften.
Gray, Jeremy (ed.). 1999. The Symboli Universe: Geometry and Physis 1890
1930. Oxford: University Press.
Heinzmann, Gerhard. 1982. Shematisierte Strukturen. Eine Untersuhung über
den Idoneismus F. Gonseths auf dem Hintergrund eines konstruktivistis-
hen Ansatzes. Bern/Stuttgart: Paul Haupt.
16
Hendriks, Vinent F.; Pedersen, Stigandur; Jørgensen Klaus F. (eds.). 2000.
Proof Theory: History and Philosophial Signiane. Dordreht et.:
Kluwer.
Hilbert, David. 1992. Natur und mathematishes Erkennen.Vorlesungen, gehal-
ten 19191920 in Göttingen. Nah Ausarbeitungen von P. Bernays. Hrsg.
D. Rowe. Basel et.: Birkhäuser.
Husserl, Edmund. 1901/02. Logishe Untersuhungen. Weitere Auagen: Bd.
II:
2
1921, Bd. I:
2
1922, . . .
6
1980. Halle: Niemeyer. . Husserliana XIX 1,2,
Den Haag: Martinus Nijho (Kluwer) 1984.
Husserl, Edmund. 1913. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänome-
nologishen Philosophie. Jahrbuh für Philosophie und phänomenologishe
Forshung 1. Weitere Auagen
2
1922,
3
1928 Halle: Niemeyer. Überarbeit-
eter Neudruk Husserliana III. Vol. 1 Den Haag: Martinus Nijho 1950.
Husserl, Edmund. 1994. Briefwehsel, Bd. VII Wissenshaftlerkorrespondenz.
Dordreht: Kluwer.
Illih, Ivan. 1973. Tools for Conviviality. Frenh, Paris: Seuil 1974, German,
Hamburg: Rowohlt 1980, et. New York: Harper and Row.
Manosu, Paolo; Rykman, Thomas. 2000. Mathematis, physis, and phe-
nomenology. The orresponene between Oskar Beker and Hermann
Weyl. Berkeley: Preprint (to appear in Philosophia Mathematia).
O'Raifeartaigh, Lohlainn; Straumann, Norbert. 2000. Gauge theory: Histor-
ial origins and some modern developments. Reviews of Modern Physis
72:123.
Reih, Karin. 1992. Levi-Civitashe Parallelvershiebung, aner Zusammen-
hang, Übertragungsprinzip: 1916/17-1922/23. Arhive for History of Ex-
at Sienes 44:77105.
Renn, Jürgen; Stahel, John. 1999. Hilbert's foundations of physis: From a
theory of everything to a onstituent of general relativity. Berlin: Preprint
118, MPI für Wissenshaftsgeshihte.
Rowe, David. 2000. Einstein meets Hilbert: At the rossroads of physis and
mathematis. Mainz: Preprint.
Sholz, Erhard. 1995. Hermann Weyl's Purely Innitesimal Geometry. In Pro-
eedings of the International Congress of Mathematiians, Zürih Switzer-
land 1994. Basel et.: Birkhäuser pp. 15921603.
Sholz, Erhard. 2000. Hermann Weyl on the onept of ontinuum. In
(Hendriks 2000). pp. 213237.
Sholz, Erhard (ed.). 2001. Hermann Weyl's Raum - Zeit - Materie and a
General Introdution to His Sienti Work. Basel et.: Birkhäuser.
Shweber, Silvan S. 1994. QED and the Men Who Made it: Dyson, Feynman,
Shwinger, and Tomonaga. Prineton: University Press.
17
Siegmund-Shultze, Reinhard. 2001. Rokefeller and the Internationalization of
Mathematis Between the Two World Wars. Basel et.: Birkhäuser.
Sigurdsson, Skúli. 2001. Journeys in spaetime. In (Sholz 2001). pp. 1547.
Stahel, John. 1995. History of relativity. In Twentieth Century Physis, vol.
I, ed. B. Pippard, L. Brown, A. Pais. Bristol, Philadelphia, New York,:
Institute of Physis Publishing hapter 4, pp. 249356.
Straumann, Norbert. 2001. Ursprünge der Eihtheorien. In (Sholz 2001).
pp. 138160.
Tieszen, Rihard. 2000. The philosophial bakground of Weyl's mathematial
onstrutivism. Philosophia Mathematia 8:274.
Tonietti, Tito. 1988. Four letters of E. Husserl to H. Weyl and their ontext. In
(Deppert 1988). pp. 343384.
van Dalen, Dirk. 1984. Four letters from Edmund Husserl to Hermann Weyl.
Husserl Studies 1:112.
Vizgin, Vladimir. 1994. Unied Field Theories in the First Third of the 20th
Century. Translated from the Russian by J. B. Barbour. Basel et.:
Birkhäuser.
Weyl, Hermann. 1918a. Das Kontinuum. Kritishe Untersuhungen über die
Grundlagen der Analysis. Leipzig: Veit.
Weyl, Hermann. 1918b. Raum, - Zeit - Materie. Weitere Auagen:
2
1919,
3
1919,
4
1921,
5
1923,
6
1970,
7
1988. Berlin et.: Springer.
Weyl, Hermann. 1921. Über die neue Grundlagenkrise der Mathematik. Math-
ematishe Zeitshrift 10:3979, GA II, 143180, [41℄.
Weyl, Hermann. 1925/1988. Riemanns geometrishe Ideen, ihre Auswirkungen
und ihre Verknüpfung mit der Gruppentheorie. Berlin et.: Springer.
Weyl, Hermann. 1927. Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenshaft,
Handbuh der Philosophie, Abt. 2A. Weitere Auagen
2
1949,
3
1966.
Münhen: Oldenbourg. English with omments and appendies (Weyl
1949).
Weyl, Hermann. 1948. Wissenshaft als symbolishe Konstruktion des Men-
shen. Eranos-Jahrbuh pp. 375431. GA IV, 289345, [142℄.
Weyl, Hermann. 1949. Philosophy of Mathematis. and Natural Siene. 2nd
ed. 1950. Prineton: University Press.
Weyl, Hermann. 1954. Erkenntnis und Besinnung (Ein Lebensrükblik). Stu-
dia Philosophia. GA IV, 631649, [166℄.
Weyl, Hermann. 1968. Gesammelte Abhandlungen, 4 vols. Ed. K. Chan-
drasekharan. Berlin et.: Springer.
Weyl, Hermann. Ms 1949a. Entwiklungslinien der Mathematik seit 1900. Prob-
lems and methods of 20th entury mathematis. Gastvorlesung nah 1950,
english. Nahlaÿ Weyl, Zürih: ETH Bibliothek Hs 91a:72.
18
19
